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WHEN THE BEST DEFENSE IS NO
DEFENSE: THE FUTURE OF STATE-
OF-THE-ART EVIDENCE IN
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS IN
MISSOURI
Elmore v. Owens-Illinois'
A paint manufacturer develops a quick-drying and inexpensive paint that
adheres to virtually any surface. The secret is an additive with exceptional
bonding capacity. The manufacturer, a prudent business person, conscien-
tiously studies all the relevant scientific literature to determine whether there
are any health hazards associated with the use of the additive. Although she
finds no evidence of risk, she cautiously invests in further product safety re-
search. After extensive testing confirms the harmlessness of the additive, the
manufacturer produces and markets the paint for ten years and then sells that
line of products to another company.
Five years later a report published by a prominent scientist suggests that
breathing fumes from paint containing the additive may cause serious lung
damage. Another five years pass, and a painter brings a product liability ac-
tion against the original manufacturer. The painter claims that his lungs have
been damaged by inhaling fumes from the paint, and that the paint was defec-
tively designed and unreasonably dangerous.
At trial, should the manufacturer be allowed to argue that the design was
not defective and unreasonably dangerous because, given the state of the art at
the time of manufacture, the risks associated with the additive were scientifi-
cally unknowable? In a recent decision involving a factually similar situation,
the Supreme Court of Missouri declared that "state of the art evidence has no
bearing on the outcome of a strict liability claim .... ,,2 This note will ex-
amine the Elmore decision with particular focus on the majority and dissent-
ing opinions. The note will consider the extent to which the Elmore holding as
to state-of-the-art evidence promotes the social policies underlying strict liabil-
ity in tort. Finally, the note will identify those areas of Missouri law in which
state-of-the-art evidence should still be admissible.
Arthur Elmore was an asbestos worker from 1943 until 1976. During the
years 1948 to 1958, he frequently worked with Kaylo, an insulating material
composed of several substances (including fifteen percent asbestos), which was
1. 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
2. Id. at 438.
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manufactured and distributed by Owens-Illinois. Installing Kaylo required
pounding and sawing, often in enclosed areas, and filled the air with dust. In
the late 1960's, Elmore learned that working with asbestos could cause asbesto-
sis, an incurable lung disease. In 1973, he began to experience shortness of
breath, a symptom of asbestosis, but he was not diagnosed as having asbestosis
until May 13, 1976.- Although Elmore was a Kansas resident, he filed suit in
Missouri, and the trial court applied the statute of limitations and the substan-
tive law of Missouri. 4 The jury returned verdicts of $117,250 for Mr. Elmore
and $43,750 for Mrs. Elmore, but the trial court reduced the award. The
Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the liability of Owens-Illinois
and reversed the trial court's reduction of damages. 5 Owens-Illinois appealed,
claiming that the trial court erred when it refused to admit defendant's evi-
dence that under the state of the art6 at the time of manufacture,7 the defen-,
3. Id. at 435-36. The court held that his cause of action accrued on the date
his doctor made her diagnosis. It was not until that time that the character of his
condition (asbestosis) and its cause (breathing asbestos dust) "came together" for El-
more. Id. at 436.
4. The statute of limitations was two years in Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
513(a)(4) (1983), and five in Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120 (1978). The court
held that Elmore's cause of action accrued when and where damages were sustained
and capable of ascertainment. In this case, that occurred in Kansas City, Missouri,
when his doctor made her diagnosis. Id. at 436.
On the substantive law choice issue, the court had previously adopted the rule of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) for determining the sub-
stantive law to be applied in tort cases. Using those guidelines, the court decided that
because Elmore's employment was chiefly for Kansas City, Missouri, based employers,
out of his Kansas City, Missouri, union, Missouri was the state with the most signifi-
cant relationship to the occurrence and to the parties. 673 S.W.2d at 437.
5. Id. at 438-39. The trial judge reduced the verdicts to $17,250 and $7,750
because affidavits taken from all twelve jurors indicated that they had failed to follow
the court's instruction to deduct from the total damages award the sums already re-
ceived by the plaintiffs from other defendants in settlement. The appellate court re-
versed the reduction of damages, and the supreme court affirmed the appellate court's
holding that the trial judge should not have reduced the award when there was no
ambiguity in the verdict and nothing in the record except for the affidavits from the
jurors to suggest that the jurors had made a mistake. Under those circumstances, it
was improper for the judge to impeach the jury's verdict. Id. at 439.
6. The term "state of the art" has been used in a variety of ways. It sometimes
refers to the standards of an industry at the time the product was manufactured. E.g.,
Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, -, 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (1973)
(punch press manufacturer not allowed to use state-of-the-art defense to escape liabil-
ity by showing that he had done "what the rest of [the] industry had done to make
their products safe"). In other cases, the term apparently means compliance with gov-
ernmental regulations. See, e.g., Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 64 I11. App. 3d 770,
__ 381 N.E.2d 715, 724 (1978) (tank car's conformity to federally prescribed de-
sign standards characterized as "state of the art"), rev'd. on other grounds, 77 Ill. 2d
434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979). In still other cases, "state of the art" seems to be synony-
mous with "feasibility" and involves a balancing of costs, safety, scientific knowledge,
technological capability, and other factors. Cf. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968) (manufacturer's duty to design product as safe as rea-
2
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dant could not have known of the product's danger.8 Owens-Illinois argued
that under the design defect theory submitted by the plaintiff, the state-of-the-
art defense should be permitted because there can be no defect unless the
manufacturer knew or should have known that the product could be designed
in a safer manner.9
Recognizing that jurisdictions differ on admissibility of state of the art in
design defect cases,10 the majority opinion' rejected Owens-Illinois' argument
sonably possible under the present state of the art). The fourth definition, and the one
which seems to have been adopted in Missouri, is the highest level of scientific and
technical knowledge existing at the time the product was manufactured and distrib-
uted. See, e.g., Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. App., E.D. 1978)
(Ford argued that it had "built the safest armrest possible under the technology ex-
isting in 1957"), cited with approval in Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 438.
The characterization accepted by a court is significant because the use of different
definitions may change the standard of care to which a manufacturer will be held. For
example, it may be relatively easy for a manufacturer to demonstrate compliance with
the general customs of the industry, but difficult to show that a product was manufac-
tured in accordance with the best scientific and technical knowledge available at the
time.
7. Id. at 437. Owens-Illinois stopped manufacturing Kaylo in 1958 and
claimed that prior to that time it could not have learned of the dangers associated with
asbestos in insulation products. Id. at 437.
8. The courts have taken three basic approaches in defining a defective design.
The consumer-expectation approach is set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1965) and refers to a "defective design unreasonably dangerous." Comment i
defines unreasonably dangerous as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to its characteristics." The Missouri Supreme Court
has indicated that it uses this definition of defective condition. See, e.g., Aronson's
Men's Stores v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 632 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
Other courts, using a risk/utility analysis, define defect by balancing the benefits of the
allegedly defective design against its risks. E.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey,
609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W. Va.
857, 253 S.E.2d 666 (1979). The third approach is a combination of the first two. In
other words, a product is defective if it fails either the consumer-expectation test or the
risk/utility test. E.g., Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, 604 P.2d 1059, 1062
(Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, _ 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
-', 573 P.2d 443, 454-55 (1978).
9. Id. at 437. Specifically, Owens-Illinois claimed that the trial court erred in
submitting the case to the jury under MIssouRI APPROVED INSTRUCTION (MAI) 25.04
Strict Liability Product-Defect rather than under MAI 25.05 Strict Liabil-
ity-Failure to Warn. The supreme court held that it is the plaintiff's prerogative to
choose the theory upon which his case is to be submitted, so long as that theory is
supported by the evidence. Id. (citing Robinson v. St. John's Medical Center, 508
S.W.2d 7, 12 (Mo. App., Spr. 1974)). The court characterized the defendant's claim
that the case was submitted under the wrong MAI as "a more fundamental assertion:
that state of the art should have been permitted by the trial court even under the
design defect theory . . . ." Id. at 437.
10. Id. at 438 (citing Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Products Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 3-19 (1982)).
11. Written by Judge Higgins; Judges Rendlen, Gunn, Billings, and Blackmar
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and stated that Elmore had proved that Kaylo was defective when he proved
that it was unreasonably dangerous as designed.12 That done, the plaintiff did
not have to demonstrate that Owens-Illinois was at fault in a negligence
sense.
13
The majority opinion did not offer a lengthy explanation of its reasoning.
Instead, it presented the holding as consistent with the principles adopted in
earlier Missouri cases dealing with product liability issues .
4
During the twentieth century, products liability cases generally evolved
from actions based on warranty or negligence to actions based on strict liabil-
ity.'5 Indeed, a number of commentators argue that in some jurisdictions the
courts now impose absolute liability on manufacturers, making them, in effect,
insurers of their products.' 6
Historically, the move toward strict liability was a response to the difficul-
ties the warranty theory presented plaintiffs who attempted to recover for inju-
ries suffered because of defective products. 17 These problems prompted the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to eliminate the term "war-
ranty" when they composed section 402A (Special Liability of Seller of Prod-
uct for Physical Harm to User or Consumer) and to impose strict tort liability
under certain circumstances.' 8 Section 402A reduces the burden of proof for
the plaintiff in that he does not have to prove specific acts of negligence, and it
protects him from some of the defenses available to the defendant under a
warranty theory. 19
The reasoning of section 402A was first applied in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products20 in 1963. Since that time, the majority of states have adopted
the rule of strict product liability as set out in section 402A. 21 Missouri courts
have followed this general trend. In 1969, the Missouri Supreme Court, in
Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 2 adopted section 402A as the
concurring.
12. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 438.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 437-38; see infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971).
16. See, e.g., Robb, supra note 10, at 30.
17. E.g., Butaud v. Submarine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 44
(Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, _ 144 Cal. Rptr.
380, _ 575 P.2d 1162, 1165 (1978); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162
W. Va. 857, 253 S.E.2d 666, 676 (1979).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
19. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, __, 144 Cal
Rptr. 380, - 575 P.2d 1162, 1165 (1978) ("Warranty actions . . . [required] a
precedent notice to the vendor of a breach of warranty, and [absolved] him from loss if
he had issued an adequate disclaimer.").
20. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
21. Robb, supra note 10, at 9 n.29 (listing 30 states and citing the case in
which the rule was adopted).
22. 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
1985]
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law of product liability in Missouri.23
In Keener, the Court listed three reasons for its decision to adopt the rule
of strict liability in tort. First, it stated that, as a policy matter, strict liability
would insure that the manufacturers who put defective products on the market
would bear the costs of injuries caused by such products. The court accepted
the Greenman conclusion that this result was preferable to the alternative of
leaving the costs where they naturally fall-on the victims who are helpless to
protect themselves. 24 Second, the court explained that adopting the Restate-
ment theory would release Missouri courts from the shackles of warranty lan-
guage. Finally, it reasoned that adopting section 402A would give the bench
and bar a sense of direction in product liability cases.2 5 It is the first reason,
the policy concern which favors shifting the costs of injuries caused by defec-
tive products from the injured person to the manufacturer, that has most influ-
enced subsequent developments in Missouri case law including the decision in
Elmore.
In 1977, in Blevins v. Cushman Motors,26 the Missouri Supreme Court
extended strict liability to include products which are unreasonably dangerous
because of design defects in addition to those unreasonably dangerous because
of manufacturing defects.27 The court further set the stage for its later deci-
23. Id. at 365. The widow of Harold Keener brought a wrongful death action
against Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co. (Dayton). Her husband had been electro-
cuted when he lifted a Dayton sump pump out of ankle deep water in his friend's
basement. Keener alleged that the pump was defective because it was not equipped
with a ground wire or an overload protector. After adopting section 402A, the court
remanded the case for retrial, specifically holding that Dayton, a wholesale distributor,
could be held liable for Keener's death if the jury found that "the pump, as sold by
Dayton, was defective and therefore dangerous when put to a use reasonably antici-
pated, and that it was used by Harold Keener in a manner reasonably anticipated." Id.
at 363-64 (emphasis in original).
24. Keener, 445 S.W.2d at 364 (quoting Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901).
25. Id. at 366.
26. 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). In Blevins, the plaintiff and his wife
sued for personal injuries suffered when the golf cart in which the plaintiff was a pas-
senger overturned. They alleged that the golf cart was defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous because its stability could have been improved in several specific ways. Id. at
608.
27. Generally a product defect will be one of three types. A manufacturing de-
fect is a flaw that unintentionally develops during the construction or marketing process
and makes one particular item more dangerous than similar items which meet the man-
ufacturer's standards. For example, a weak spot that causes a tire to blow out is a
manufacturing defect.
In a failure-to-warn defect, the product, which is made as the manufacturer in-
tended, may be safe if used in one way but dangerous if used in another. The product is
defective only if it is not accompanied by an adequate warning. Rubbing alcohol, for
instance, is safe for external use, but would probably be defective if the manufacturer
did not warn consumers of the dangers of ingesting it.
The third type is the design defect. Here the product is manufactured in accor-
dance with design specifications, but courts later determine that the product is so dan-
gerous that liability should attach. For a discussion of the tests used to determine
442 [Vol. 50
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sion in Elmore by explaining the distinction between negligence and strict lia-
bility in defective design cases. The court noted that in negligence actions the
emphasis is on the foreseeability of harm or injury while strict liability theory
focuses on the foreseeability of the use of the product.2 8 In other words, the
issue in negligence is the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in de-
signing the article, but in strict liability the issue is the dangerousness of the
article designed in a particular way.2 9 Negligence is concerned with the con-
duct of the manufacturer, strict liability with the unreasonably dangerous de-
fect of the product.
The next major step was taken by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern
District, in the following year. In Cryts v. Ford Motor Co.,30 a car driver, who
was paralyzed in a collision with a second car, sued the manufacturer of his
own vehicle on a strict liability theory, claiming that his back was broken by a
defectively designed armrest when he was thrown against the car door during
the collision.
Ford argued that it had built the safest armrest possible under the tech-
nology existing in 1957. The court held that such a state-of-the-art defense had
"no bearing on the outcome of a strict liability claim, where the sole subject of
inquiry is the defective condition of the product and not the manufacturer's
knowledge, negligence, or fault."3' The court further stated that even if the
argument were relevant, it was not supported by the evidence.32
In summarizing Keener, Blevins, and Cryts, the majority opinion in El-
more suggested that rejection of the state-of-the-art defense in design defect
cases was the reasonable result of adhering to established case law. Two
judges, however, disagreed strongly in separate opinions. 33
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Welliver argued that the plaintiff's evi-
dence supported a failure-to-warn case rather than a design defect case, that
the case should have been submitted under MAI 25.05,m and that, conse-
quently, Owens-Illinois should have been allowed to introduce state-of-the-art
evidence to explain its inability to warn of dangers not scientifically discover-
able at the time of manufacture.3 5 Judge Welliver contended that denying
Owens-Illinois such an opportunity to defend itself makes manufacturers in-
surers and imposes absolute rather than strict liability.38
Most of Judge Donnelly's dissent consists of his quotation of section 402A
whether a design is defective, see supra note 8.
28. Blevins, 551 S.W.2d at 607.
29. Id. at 608 (quoting Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, .----, 525
P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974) (en banc)).
30. 571 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. App., E.D. 1978).
31. Id. at 689.
32. Id.
33. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 435.
34. See supra note 9.
35. 673 S.W.2d at 439-40 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 440.
1985]
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and related comments. 37 Donnelly contended that the majority ignored the
concerns articulated in those comments by forbidding consideration of evi-
dence which was relevant to the question of whether the product, Kaylo, was
unreasonably dangerous.38 He argued that the majority's holding as to the
nonadmissibility of state-of-the-art evidence had, in effect, amended section
402A so that a seller could be held liable for a product in a defective condition
that causes injury to a consumer or user even though there is no showing that
the product was "unreasonably dangerous."39 Both dissenting judges con-
cluded that the case should have been reversed and remanded so that the jury
could compare the fault of the parties as mandated by the supreme court in
Gustafson v. Benda.40
The major problem with the Elmore decision is that it significantly ex-
pands the scope of liability for manufacturers without explaining sufficiently
the policy considerations prompting that expansion. Although the majority ap-
parently believed that their decision was merely the logical consequence of
following firmly established case law,41 there are two reasons why those earlier
cases need not have led to the decision reached by the majority. First and most
obvious, the Cryts case was decided by an appellate court and thus was not
binding on the Missouri Supreme Court.42 Second, and perhaps less obvious,
the kind of state-of-the-art evidence offered by Ford in Cryts was entirely dif-
ferent from that offered by Owens-Illinois.
State of the art generally becomes an issue when there is a significant
difference between what was known about a product at the time it was distrib-
uted and what is known about it at the time of trial.43 The change in knowl-
edge which occurs can be either of two types. In some instances, between the
time of distribution and the time of trial, a scientific or technological develop-
ment occurs which makes it possible to eliminate a risk that was known at the
time of distribution.44 In other situations, state of the art at the time of trial
37. Id. at 441-43 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (discussing section 402A comments
i, j, k, and n).
38. Id. at 442.
39. Id. at 443.
40. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (adopting the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act § 1-6). Comparative fault went into effect on January 31, 1984, supra note
20 and accompanying text, after the trial court and appellate court decisions in Elmore
had been handed down but before the supreme court decision in Elmore. In Gustafson,
the court said, "Except for the instant case and interim cases where the parties can
mutually agree, comparative fault shall apply only in cases in which trial begins after
the date of publication of this opinion in the advance sheets of the Southwestern Re-
porter." Id. at 15.
41. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 437-38.
42. Cryts was decided by the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District. The
opinion was written by Judge Gunn, who is now a member of the Missouri Supreme
Court and who concurred with the Elmore majority opinion.
43. See Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable
Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 751 (1983).
44. See, e.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746-47
[Vol. 50
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makes it possible to be aware of a risk that was not scientifically knowable at
the time of distribution.45 The distinction is between failure to know of a safer
alternative and failure to know of the hazard presented by the product.
The state-of-the-art evidence Ford wanted to present as a defense in
Cryts was of the first type. At the time the car was manufactured and distrib-
uted, it was scientifically knowable that a person thrown against a thinly pad-
ded arm rest during a collision could be injured. Consequently, the issue was
whether feasible, safer design alternatives were available.4 6 Thus, the narrow
holding of Cryts is that state-of-the-art evidence regarding the feasibility of
alternative designs at the time of distribution is irrelevant in a strict liability
design defect case.
47
In Elmore, on the other hand, the central issue was not the feasibility of a
safer design for Kaylo.48 Instead, the question was whether, at the time Kaylo
was produced, it was scientifically knowable that the low level of asbestos to
which insulation workers ordinarily are exposed could cause asbestosis.49 The
court did not discuss the fact that the state-of-the-art evidence in Elmore con-
cerned an unknowable risk while that in Cryts involved the feasibility of alter-
native designs. Either the court failed to note the distinction or it considered
the difference unimportant.50
(Tex. 1980) (safety device known as a kill switch would cut off motor of bass boat if
the driver fell out).
45. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374
(1984) (knowledge that tetracycline administered to babies can cause tooth
discoloration).
46. Cryts, 571 S.W.2d at 689.
47. Id.
48. There was a factual dispute concerning the feasibility of manufacturing
Kaylo without asbestos, but the trial focused on whether it was possible to know the
dangers of asbestos.
49. The supreme court's statement that state of the art is irrelevant in a design
defect case might lead the reader to believe that Owens-Illinois was not permitted to
present such evidence at trial. On the contrary, both the plaintiff and the defendant
presented extensive evidence relating to the level of scientific knowledge available at
the time Kaylo was manufactured. The judge admitted the evidence in relation to the
issues of negligent failure to warn and of punitive damages, but refused to allow the
jury to consider state of the art in connection with the strict liability defective design
action. Record at 1063-70.
50. The distinction is significant for a number of reasons. If a product presents
a known but justifiable risk, the manufacturer has several options. The manufacturer
can issue a warning that will lessen the risk (such as "Caution. Fumes from this prod-
uct are dangerous. Use only in a well ventilated area."). Second, the manufacturer can
intensify research intended to develop a safer product, such as a more crashworthy car.
Third, the manufacturer can estimate the amount of liability it is likely to incur as the
result of damage claims brought by injured consumers, and can raise the price of the
product accordingly. For example, a bottler who knows that one in every ten thousand
bottles will explode for no apparent reason can estimate the amount of compensation
that will be required. But, as will be discussed later, if the danger presented by the
product is unknowable, none of these options is available to the manufacturer.
1985]
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In one way, the court's decision to make the manufacturer liable for sci-
entifically unknowable risks is not surprising. Such a ruling is at least consis-
tent with Missouri's test for a defective design that is unreasonably danger-
ous. 51 In Missouri, the plaintiff in a strict liability design defect case must
prove that: I) the defendant sold the product in the course of his business; 2)
the product was then in a defective condition 52 unreasonably dangerous53 when
put to a reasonably anticipated use;5 4 3) the product was used in a manner
reasonably anticipated; and 4) the plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of
such defective condition as existed when the product was sold.55
Because it is not necessary to prove that the manufacturer knew or could
have known that the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous, neither the fact that the risk is scientifically unknowable nor the fact
that no safer design is feasible is relevant as to the manufacturer's standard of
care. Those issues should, however, be relevant in determining whether the
product is defective.56
In Missouri, the consumer-expectation test articulated in section 402A
determines whether a given product is defectively designed. In other words, a
defective and unreasonably dangerous product is one "which is dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the user with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community." 57 If the consumer-expectation
test is strictly applied, state-of-the-art evidence is usually irrelevant58 because
the question is simply, "Would the typical consumer recognize the danger
presented by the car's armrest or by the amount of asbestos in Kaylo?"
51. Blevins, 551 S.W.2d at 607 (defective design that is unreasonably danger-
ous equated with "defective and dangerous when put to a use reasonably anticipated"
by the manufacturer).
52. The courts have recognized that it is possible for a product to be defective
but not unreasonably dangerous so as to support a cause of action under a strict liabil-
ity theory. E.g., Aronson's Men's Stores v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 632 S.W.2d 472,
474 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (burglar alarm may not have rendered reasonable level of
performance but did not explode, ignite, or cause harm to property and therefore was
not in any sense dangerous).
53. The unreasonably dangerous element is the same for manufacturing defects,
design defects, and inadequate warnings.
54. Presumably, the term "reasonably anticipated use" is meant to be broader
than "intended use." Cf. Lewis v. Bucyrus Erie, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1981) (en
banc) (defendant argued that lifting personnel with a crane was not an anticipated
use).
55. These elements are set forth in MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(MAI) 25.04 Verdict Directing--Strict Liability-Product Defect [1978 Revision].
56. See Robb, supra note 10, at 16.
57. See, e.g., St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Armco Steel Corp., 359 F. Supp. 760, 762
(1973) (applying Missouri law), rev'd. in part, 490 F.2d 367 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974).
58. But see Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir.
1976) (allowing admission of defendant's state-of-the art evidence to help determine
whether "the ordinary consumer would expect a plane made in 1952 to have the same
safety features of one made in 1970").
[Vol. 50
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The most significant question presented by Elmore is not whether the
holding is consistent with Missouri's consumer-expectation test but whether
Missouri courts should continue to use consumer expectation as the exclusive
test for defective design. Missouri courts have frequently indicated that strict
liability is not absolute liability and that the manufacturer is not an insurer
who will be held liable for every mishap that occurs in connection with its
products. 59 Instead, the manufacturer is held liable only if the product is both
defective and unreasonably dangerous. 60 If the requirement of an unreasona-
bly dangerous defect is meant to limit the manufacturer's liability to some
extent (and there is no other apparent reason for the requirement), then the
definition of unreasonably dangerous defect should be used to advance the pol-
icy considerations underlying strict liability.61 A careful examination of those
policy considerations shows the inadequacy of the consumer-expectation test.
When the Missouri Supreme Court first adopted strict liability in Keener
sixteen years ago, the social policy the court emphasized was the desirability
of shifting the burden of injury from the innocent consumer to the manufac-
turer who could spread the cost among all consumers who benefit from the
product. This goal of risk spreading has continued to influence the court.
62
The connection between this goal and the use of consumer expectation to
define defect is based on the assumption that the consumer has a right to rely
on the apparent safety of the product marketed.6 3 The corollary view is that if
the customer is aware of the risk presented by the product (either because the
risk is obvious or because the manufacturer has given an adequate warning), it
would be unjust to hold the manufacturer liable, presumably because the con-
sumer could have taken steps to protect against a known danger.
The consumer-expectation test was articulated in section 402A twenty
years ago. During the intervening years, the inadequacies of that test have
become increasingly apparent, and a number of courts no longer rely on it as
the sole test of defective design."
59. Abnormal use of the product has been held to bar recovery regardless of
alleged design defects. E.g., Baker v. International Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1983) (unannounced and unexpected boarding of combine ladder by hunter
while holding a gun).
60. Leitz v. Snyder Mfg. Co., 475 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Mo. 1972) (gym bar
which collapsed when son was hanging from it).
61. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv.
339, 359 (1974).
62. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 438; Cryts, 571 S.W.2d at 687.
63. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1123 (1960).
64. Several courts use the risk/utility test. E.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94
N.J. 169, -, 463 A.2d 298, 304 (1983) (risk/utility analysis based on policy judg-
ment that some products are so dangerous that they create a risk of harm outweighing
any usefulness); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 681 (W.
Va. 1979) (product is defective if not reasonably safe for its intended use).
Other courts take the position that a product can be defective if it fails either of
two alternative tests: the consumer-expectation test or the risk/utility test. E.g., Heri-
1985]
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One problem with the consumer expectation test if it is interpreted
strictly is that the consumer can never recover for an injury suffered as the
result of a defective design involving an obvious risk.6 5 That result may be just
in some instances. Certainly a consumer who is cut while using a sharp knife
should not hold the manufacturer responsible for the consumer's carelessness.
On the other hand, the balance of equities changes when the manufacturer
distributes a complex and expensive machine which could be made much safer
with the addition of a relatively inexpensive safety device.66 It seems unfair to
conclude that the manufacturer who chooses not to include that safety feature
is free from liability simply because the customer knew of the obvious risk.
The unfairness is particularly obvious when the customer's knowledge of the
risk nevertheless offers no meaningful opportunity to avoid it.
67
Another problem with the consumer-expectation test is that it is often
difficult to determine exactly what the consumer's expectations are. Fre-
quently, the consumer knows nothing about the safety or danger of a particu-
lar product. If the ordinary consumer would have no expectation as to the risk
involved, it is almost impossible for a jury to use that standard in determining
whether the design was defective.68
Probably the major flaw in the consumer-expectation approach is that it
is too simplistic; it focuses on only one of many factors that should be consid-
ered to further the social policies promoted by the doctrine of strict liability in
tort.6 9 Consequently, many scholars now advocate some form of risk/utility
test in determining whether a product is defective.70 A jury that is asked to
use the risk/utility test must consider all the relevant factors and decide
whether the benefit of the product as designed outweighs its risk. If the benefit
tage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Alaska 1979); Barker v.
Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, ., 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, .. , 573 P.2d 443, 454-55
(1978).
65. See Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1964) (manufac-
turer not obligated to provide a protective device to prevent injury from a patent peril
or a source manifestly dangerous). But see McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc.,
672 F.2d 652, 664 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Missouri law) ("The issue is not whether
a jury can conclude that the danger is obvious or apparent, but is whether the jury can
conclude that the danger is obvious and apparent to the extent that the product was not
unreasonably dangerous.").
66. See Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review
of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 590 (1980).
67. Industrial machinery is involved in many instances. In that situation, it is
the employer who decides which machines to buy. The employees who operate obvi-
ously dangerous machines have little choice. They take their chances or they seek other
employment.
68. See Keeton, supra note 66, at 591.
69. See Fischer, supra note 61, at 359 (listing thirteen factors, including knowl-
edge of risk, which the court should consider in deciding when to impose strict
liability).
70. See Keeton, supra note 66, at 592; Fischer, supra note 61, at 358.
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outweighs the risk, the product is not defective.71
At first glance this test seems to inject the principles of negligence into a
strict liability action. But as scholars Keeton 2 and Wade7 3 have indicated, it
differs because in a negligence action the question is whether a reasonable
manufacturer should have known of the risk when the product was distributed.
On the other hand, in a strict liability action, knowledge of the risk is imputed
to the manufacturer. Then the question is whether the manufacturer, knowing
the risk presented by the product, was nonetheless justified in marketing it.7 4
Courts that use the risk/utility analysis generally admit state of the art
evidence to establish the level of knowledge that should be imputed to the
manufacturer.75 Because the manufacturer is held to the level of an expert,76 it
is assumed that the manufacturer was aware of all research related to possible
risks presented by the product.
Even if a court decides to admit state-of-the-art evidence, it must deter-
mine additionally whether the relevant state-of-the-art is that which existed at
the time of distribution or that which exists at the time of trial.77 Both courts
and scholars disagree on this issue,78 but a careful examination of the social
policies involved suggests that, at least in regard to scientifically unknowable
risks, it would be better to consider state of the art at the time of distribution.
Four significant policy considerations exist. The first is that of risk
spreading.7 9 Those who advocate imputing to the manufacturer state-of-the-art
knowledge available at the time of trial usually stress this goal. They argue
that the manufacturer is in a better position than the injured person to bear
the financial burden caused by the injury because the manufacturer can
spread the loss by raising the price of the product or by purchasing product
71. See, e.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex.
1980).
72. See Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tnx. L.
REV. 398, 403-04 (1970).
73. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973).
74. For example, thousands of Americans are killed or injured in automobile
accidents each year, and yet most of us believe that the benefits of cars outweigh their
risks.
75. See, e.g., Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 746.
76. Brown v. Raux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo. 1958).
77. See Wade, supra note 43, at 753.
78. Favoring time of trial: Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J.
191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973). Favoring time of manufacture or distribution: Heath v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,
94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d
743 (Tex. 1980); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W. Va. 857, 253
S.E.2d 666 (1979); Wade, supra note 43, at 760.
79. Byrne, Strict Liability and the Scientifically Unknowable Risk, 57 MARQ.
L. REV. 660, 663 (1974).
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liability insurance. 80 This argument is persuasive if the manufacturer knows of
the risk. The issue is quite different, however, when the existence of the risk is
scientifically unknowable at the time of distribution. In that case, it is impossi-
ble to anticipate either the scope or the severity of the risk. If the manufac-
turer cannot estimate the cost of compensating unknown numbers of victims
for unknown injuries, the manufacturer can not pass on those costs to consum-
ers by raising prices.81 Furthermore, the skyrocketing cost of product liability
insurance8 2 and other insurance problems 83 may make it impossible to buy
protection against unknown dangers. Even scholars who generally advocate ex-
pansion of the manufacturer's liability concede that the result may be an in-
crease in the price of products and the disappearance from the market of some
beneficial and inexpensive but relatively unsafe products.8
The second important policy underlying strict liability is the goal of prod-
uct safety. Those who would impute knowledge at the time of trial to the
manufacturer point out that the amount of money the industry has inve.sted in
research primarily determines state of the art at any given time.85 Thus, mak-
ing manufacturers liable for unknown hazards should promote safety by en-
couraging industry to devote more resources to the discovery and elimination
of those risks.86
Others, however, contend that the opposite result occurs. If "defect" is
not defined at the time of distribution, then the manufacturer incurs liability
as soon as a formerly unknowable risk is discovered or as soon as a safer,
alternative design becomes feasible. Consequently, the manufacturer may be
reluctant to conduct further research. Worse yet, there may be an economic
incentive to conceal important discoveries to avoid liability for products al-
ready distributed.8 7
A third policy concern that should be mentioned is the need to simplify
litigation. Obviously, it is easier for a jury to determine what is known about a
product's risks at the time of trial than to decide what was knowable at the
time of distribution. There is some concern that conflicting expert testimony
about what could have been known at an earlier time will be unnecessarily
80. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 205, 447 A.2d 539,
547 (1982).
81. See Wade, supra note 43, at 755; see also Byrne, supra note 79, at 674.
82. See generally Note, Various Risk Allocation Schemes Under the Model
Uniform Product Liability Act. An Analysis of the Statute of Repose, Comparative
Fault Principles, and the Conflicting Social Policies Arising From Workplace Product
Injuries, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 588, 588-93 (1980).
83. See Fischer, supra note 61, at 361 ("In design defect cases the entire line is
defective. When the insurance company !earns the details of the first accident and that
serious future accidents are likely to occur, it will cancel the policy. The manufacturer
then pays the cost of subsequent accidents.").
84. Keeton, supra note 72, at 402.
85. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 208, 447 A.2d at 548.
86. Id.
87. Wade, supra note 43, at 755.
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confusing.88 In negligence actions, however, the jurors are expected to deter-
mine what the manufacturer knew or should have known at the time the alleg-
edly culpable conduct occurred.8" That expectation has not presented insur-
mountable difficulties in negligence cases90 and should not cause excessive
confusion in strict liability. In any event, expediency alone should not justify
the time-of-trial position.
The final concern is that of fairness. Those who advocate the use of state
of the art available at the time of trial usually focus on fairness to the victim.
In a case involving an unknowable risk, they conclude that, as between two
innocent parties-the manufacturer and the consumer-it is fair to shift the
financial burden to the party who caused the injury.91 Those who favor admis-
sion of state of the art available at the time of distribution stress fairness to
the manufacturer and to society as a whole. They argue that manufacturers
should not be forced into bankruptcy merely because they had the misfortune
of producing dangerous products at a time when those dangers were scientifi-
cally unknowable.9 2 They also question the wisdom of a policy that may cause
certain high-risk but very beneficial products to become unavailable to those
who need them."
It seems that the fairest approach is that taken recently by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories.9 In a prior strict
liability warning case,93 the New Jersey court ruled that the defendants could
not introduce state-of-the-art evidence supporting their claim that the health
hazard arising from exposure to insulation products containing asbestos was
scientifically undiscoverable until the 1960's.96 Two years later, however, in
Feldman, the court apparently changed its position. Feldman, a young woman
whose teeth were badly discolored by a tetracyline drug administered to her
when she was a baby, sued the manufacturer, Lederle, for failing to warn of
the drug's side effects.97 Although the Court expressly declined to overrule
Beshada, it held that "as to warnings, generally conduct should be measured
by the knowledge at the time the manufacturer distributed the product." 98
There is currently some confusion about the relationship between Beshada and
Feldman. It may be that the Beshada ruling is limited to asbestos cases or
that the Feldman holding is limited to drug cases.99 Regardless, the value of
88. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 207-08, 447 A.2d at 548.
89. Wade, supra note 43, at 754.
90. Id.
91. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549.
92. See Robb, supra note 10, at 31-32.
93. See id.
94. 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
95. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
96. Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549.
97. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 377.
98. Id. at 386.
99. Darnell & Placitella, The Beshada Case: How Has It Affected the Defense
of Toxic Torts? TRIAL, November 1984, at 52, 54.
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the Feldman case is that it offers a remarkably balanced and rational ap-
proach to the complex issue of state of the art. The Feldman approach at-
tempts to be fair to both the manufacturer and the consumer. It does this in
two ways: 1) the defendant is allowed to present evidence that the risk created
by the product was scientifically unknowable at the time of distribution (fair-
ness to the manufacturer); 100 and 2) the burden of proving the lack of knowl-
edge is on the defendant who is in a better position to know of the information
available in the particular field involved (fairness to the consumer).1 01
The effect of proving such state-of-the-art evidence is not entirely clear.
The New Jersey Supreme Court seems to be saying that state-of-the-art would
have one effect in cases involving the feasibility of safer, alternative designs.
Thus, proving that the risk was unknowable at the time of manufacture is an
affirmative defense, but proving that no safer alternative was feasible is merely
one factor to consider in a balancing of risks and benefits. 10 2
Although the Elmore holding was consistent with Missouri's consumer-
expectation test, the majority opinion apparently considered only one social
policy, that of risk spreading, when deciding the case. Future cases based on
different fact situations may lead the court to consider other important policies
and perhaps to abandon or expand the consumer-expectation approach. If that
occurs, the Missouri courts would do well to consider the fairness achieved by
the Feldman decision. Elmore is now the law of Missouri on state-of-the-art
evidence and has already been applied in at least one appellate decision. 10 3
100. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 386.
101. Id. at 386.
102. Id. at 389. In O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983),
the critical question was whether a swimming pool design using a vinyl liner in a pool
four feet deep was defective. The court said that, "'state-of-the-art' at the time of
manufacture" is one of the factors which should be considered in a risk/utility analysis.
Id. at 305. It further stated, "[a]lthough state-of-the-art evidence may be dispositive on
the facts of a particular case, it does not constitute an absolute defense apart from risk-
utility analysis. . . .[t]hat is, a product may embody the state-of-the-art and still fail
to satisfy the risk-utility equation." Id.
In Feldman, the court said that "state of the art and available knowledge" are
relevant factors in measuring reasonableness of conduct. 479 A.2d at 386. Presumably,
if the manufacturer could not have known the risk because it was scientifically undis-
coverable, it was not unreasonable to market the product. Furthermore, the court ap-
proves with only slight modification the trial court's instruction:
[l]f the defendant did not know of the danger of tooth discoloration, and if
the application of reasonably developed human skill and foresight consistent
with the state of the art and the knowledge of the scientific community ex-
isting during the periods in question would not have alerted defendant to the
danger, then there would have to be a finding for the defendant.
Id. at 380, 389.
Arguably, under Missouri's comparative fault system, scientific unknowability
would not be an affirmative defense but merely a factor to consider in apportioning
damages. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
103. Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. App., W.D.
1984) (lawn mower manufacturer not allowed to introduce evidence of voluntary corn-
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The final section of this note considers the effect of the Elmore holding on
other areas of Missouri law. The majority specifically held that "a state of the
art defense is irrelevant in a design defect case." 1° But the question remains:
When, if ever, will state-of-the-art evidence be admissible in a products liabil-
ity action?
The court in Elmore specifically precluded the use of state-of-the-art evi-
dence as a defense to a strict liability design defect action. Yet the court did
not consider whether such evidence would be admissible under a negligence
theory. The majority suggested, at least indirectly, that the defense would be
available in such a case. The majority rejected state-of-the-art evidence be-
cause it relates to the manufacturer's fault and fault is not the issue in a strict
liability action.105 But fault is precisely the issue in a negligence action, and
state of the art is directly related to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
design choice.108
For similar reasons, state-of-the-art evidence should be relevant under a
negligent failure-to-warn theory.'0° MAI 25.06 requires the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant "knew or by using ordinary care could have known of such
dangerous condition" and to prove that the defendant "failed to warn of such
dangerous condition."108 Certainly evidence that the danger was scientifically
unknowable at the time would be relevant in determining what the defendant
could have known. At the trial court level of Elmore, after the plaintiff
presented evidence intended to support the theory that Owens-Illinois had
been negligent in failing to warn of the dangers of Kaylo, the judge permitted
Owens-Illinois to present evidence that the dangers of exposure to the small
amounts of asbestos found in insulation products were unknown at the time
that Owens-Illinois manufactured Kaylo. Although the plaintiff ultimately de-
cided to submit the case as a design defect rather than a failure to warn,
apparently the judge believed that state-of-the-art evidence would have been
relevant in a negligence action.
Such evidence definitely should be allowed in cases involving unavoidably
unsafe products. Section 402A comment k1°9 excepts from strict liability those
products which "in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable
of being made safe for their intended and ordinary uses" and yet bring enor-
mous benefit to society. The example mentioned by the drafters is the vaccine
used in the Pasteur treatment of rabies. The comment explains that, because
pliance with standards adopted within the power mower industry to rebut evidence that
mower was defective or unreasonably dangerous).
104. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 435.
105. Id. at 438.
106. Id.
107. See Robb, State of Art Evidence in Missouri, 40 J. Mo. BAR 471, 475
(1984) (arguing that, according to the court's own analysis in Elmore, state of the art
is relevant to a manufacturer's negligence).
108. MIssouRi APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS 25.06 [1978 Revision].
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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the benefit outweighs the risk, the product, properly prepared and accompa-
nied by adequate directions and warning, is neither defective nor unreasonably
dangerous. Presumably, then, Missouri would allow a defendant to present
state-of-the-art evidence to prove that the product is presently incapable of
being made safe for its intended use.
The unavoidably unsafe exception has been construed quite narrowly in
Missouri.110 Owens-Illinois did not argue that asbestos is an unavoidably un-
safe product so the court did not address that issue in Elmore.
State-of-the-art evidence should also be admissible when the plaintiff re-
quests punitive damages."" In Missouri, the jury can award punitive damages
in a strict liability case if it finds that at the time the defendant sold the
product he knew of its defective condition and danger and that he thereby
showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of
others.112 If the plaintiff attempts to show that the defendant knew of the dan-
ger, the defendant should be allowed to introduce state-of-the-art evidence to
prove that he could not have known of a danger that was unknowable at the
time.113 In fact, because Elmore requested punitive damages, the trial judge
did allow Owens-Illinois to present state-of-the art evidence as to that issue.,, 4
The jury did not award punitive damages, and that issue was not appealed.
Yet another instance in which it seems fair to allow state-of-the-art evi-
dence involves Missouri's wrongful death statute.115. Section 537.090 lists fac-
tors to be considered by the jury in determining damages and states specifi-
cally that "[tihe mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the death
may be considered by the trier of facts." Unfortunately, there are no Missouri
cases defining "mitigating" circumstances. It would, however, seem logical to
allow the jury to consider as a mitigating circumstance the fact that at the
time the defendant manufactured and distributed the product, the dangerous
defect was scientifically unknowable.11 6
Allowing such evidence in determining damages would not be inconsistent
I10. Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 393-95 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981) (hold-
ing that surgical drape which caught fire during surgery is an unavoidably unsafe prod-
uct but manufacturer can still be liable for failure to warn because surgical drape does
not fall within § 402A comment j exemption), cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub.
nom. Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982); cf. Blevins, 551 S.W.2d at
608 (golf cart not an unavoidably unsafe product).
111. Missouri has standardized jury instructions specifically relating to punitive
(exemplary) damages in strict liability product defect actions. See MISSOURI AP-
PROVED INSTRUCTIONS (MAI) 10.04-.05 [1983 Revision].
112. MAI 10.04-.05.
113. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981).
114. See supra note 49.
115. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1978).
116. If aggravating circumstances permit the jury to increase the damage award,
then mitigating circumstances should, of course, allow the jury to reduce the award.
[Vol. 50
17
Daily: Daily: When the Best Defense Is No Defense:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
STATE-OF-THE-ART EVIDENCE
with the court's decision to exclude it in determining liability.11 7 Procedurally,
this could be accomplished either with a two-part trial, the first to determine
liability and the second to assess damages, 118 or by giving jury instructions
with the appropriate limitations. Either arrangement would allow an accom-
modation between the holding of Elmore and the language of the statute.
The most complex issue yet to be decided in Missouri concerns the admis-
sibility of state-of-the-art evidence in cases that involve both strict liability and
comparative fault. In Gustafson v. Benda, O the Missouri Supreme Court
adopted a "pure" system of comparative fault that went into effect on January
31, 1984, the date of Gustafson's publication in the advance sheets.1 20 In that
decision, the court did not specifically discuss the applicability of comparative
fault to strict liability actions, but the court did state that "insofar as possible"
future cases would apply the doctrine of comparative fault in accordance with
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the court attached a copy of the
UCFA to its opinion.121
The UCFA clearly provides that the "fault" of the various parties is to be
compared in strict liability actions. Section 1 of the UCFA defines fault as acts
or omissions that are negligent or reckless, or that subject a person to strict
liability in tort.122 However, a serious question remains as to whether, if faced
squarely with the issue, the Missouri Supreme Court would apply the provi-
sions of the UCFA to strict liability actions.
For example, it has been argued that the supreme court will not compare
fault in strict liability cases involving ordinary contributory negligence because
the UCFA approach is directly contradictory to prior Missouri case law. 23 In
the comments to Section 1 of the UCFA, the commissioners explain that con-
tributory fault diminishes recovery whether it was previously a bar or not, as
in the case of ordinary contributory negligence in an action based on strict
liability. 24 In contrast, in Keener, the case in which Missouri adopted strict
liability in tort as set forth in section 402A, the Court stated that "contribu-
tory negligence, as we ordinarily apply it, is not a defense in strict liability." 25
Rather than overturn existing case law, the court might decide that the Gus-
tafson "insofar as possible" caveat allows the Court to depart from the UCFA
117. Cf. Welch v. F.R. Stokes, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Colo. 1983) (in fail-
ure-to-warn action, statutory comparative fault applied only to damages, not to
liability).
118. A similar two-part trial is presently conducted in first degree murder trials
in Missouri. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (Supp. 1983).
119. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15.
120. See Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 69 n.1 (Mo. 1984).
121. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15.
122. Id. at 18. Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 41 (1985 Supp.).
123. See generally Anderson & Bruce, Recent Developments in Missouri Tort
Law: Gustafson v. Benda, 52 UMKC L. REv. 538, 543-44 (1984).
124. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 19; Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 1, 12 U.L.A.
42 (1985 Supp.).
125. Keener, 445 S.W.2d at 365.
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whenever its terms conflict with Missouri case law.12
It is more likely that the clear language of Gustafson signaled a depar-
ture from earlier case law' 21 and that the "insofar as" language applies only if
provisions of the UCFA conflict with Missouri statutory law.22 8 Such a result
is both logical and fair. Indeed, most jurisdictions that have considered the
relationship between comparative fault and strict liability issue have decided
to apply the principles of comparative fault in appropriate strict liability
actions.12
9
Assuming that the Missouri Supreme Court will allow comparison of
fault in strict liability actions, state-of-the-art evidence should definitely be
admissible, not to determine liability initially, but in apportioning damages.13 0
Under the UCFA in a strict liability action, the manufacturer of a defective
product that is unreasonably dangerous can be held liable for harm caused by
that product even though the manufacturer is in no way negligent. As the
commissioners explained, "Putting out a product that is dangerous to the user
or the public . . . involves a measure of fault that can be weighed and com-
pared, even though it is not characterized as negligence.' 3 Following that
line of reasoning, state-of-the-art evidence would not be admissible as a de-
fense against liability because the reasonableness of the manufacturer's con-
duct is not at issue.
If, however, the finder of fact decides that the plaintiff is also at fault, or
that there are two or more defendants who are at fault, the situation changes.
Evidence irrelevant as to liability is relevant in apportioning damages. UCFA
section 2 (Apportionment of Damages) requires the finder of fact to determine
the percentages of fault by considering the nature of the conduct of each party
at fault as well as the causal relation between the conduct and the damages
claimed.'3 2 The commissioners' comments recommend that the degree of fault
126. The defendant in Keener was held liable even though the plaintiff who was
electrocuted was standing in ankle deep water and was not wearing either rubber boots
or rubber gloves when he lifted the sump pump. Id. at 363-64.
127. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 16. ("[W]e supplant the doctrines of contribu-
tory negligence, last clear chance, and humanitarian negligence with a comprehensive
system of comparative fault . . ").
128. The recently revised Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (1978), prescribing a
method of apportioning a judgment against multiple tortfeasors when one defendant
has obtained a release, conflicts with section 6 of the UCFA. Although the supreme
court invited the General Assembly to reconsider the language of the statute, the court
deferred to the terms of the statute. 661 S.W.2d at 15-16 n.10.
129. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575
P.2d 1162, 1170 (1978) (listing the 30 states which had adopted some form of compar-
ative fault). Today 40 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands utilize some form of
comparative fault. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 13.
130. Welch, 555 F. Supp. at 1056 (statutory comparative fault applied only to
damages, not to liability).
131. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 19; Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 1, 12 U.L.A.
41 (1985 Supp.).
132. Id. at 43.
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of the various parties be assessed by considering their conduct "depending
upon all the circumstances." One of the circumstances mentioned is whether
the conduct was mere inadvertence or was engaged in with awareness of the
danger involved.133 State-of-the-art evidence establishing that the dangerous
defect was unknowable at the time of manufacture is definitely relevant in
proving inadvertence.
It might be argued that such a consideration involves a negligence stan-
dard and thus has no place in a strict liability action. The comments suggest
otherwise. As the commissioners explained,
A rule of law ... that no negligence is required is important in determining
whether [the defendant] is liable at all. If the liability has been established,
however; the -rule -itself doe-not play a part in determining the relative pro-
portion of fault of this party in comparison with the others.234
The purpose of applying comparative fault principles to strict liability
cases is to arrive at the fairest possible result.135 The probability of achieving
that result is far greater if the trier of fact can consider all the relevant
information.
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff, an experienced and cautious
driver, gets into her car, locks the doors, fastens her seat belt, starts the car,
and drives down the road, Just as her car reaches the crest of a hill, she sees a
vehicle heading directly toward her on the wrong side of the highway. She
starts to swerve to avoid the other vehicle, but she passes out. The two cars
collide head on. Because of a design defect in her seat belt, the latch breaks
when she is propelled forward, and she is thrown through the windshield. It is
later determined that her fainting was caused by a prescription drug she had
taken that morning for the first time.
Sometime later the plaintiff files a negligence action against the driver of
the other car, and strict liability actions against the manufacturer of her car
and the manufacturer of the medication. Assuming that the jury finds all the
defendants liable, it then faces the difficult task of apportioning damages by
comparing causation and fault.136 Surely principles of fairness dictate that the
jury be allowed to hear state-of-the-art evidence. What if the car manufac-
turer knew that safer seat belt designs were feasible? What if the drug manu-
facturer had conducted extensive research on that product for eight years, had
read all the scientific information available, but did not know of the risk in-
volved, because, given the state of the art in pharmaceutical research, the risk
of fainting was unknowable until the plaintiff fainted?
133. Id.
134. Id. at 44.
135. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, _., 144 Cal Rptr.
380, -, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (1978).
136. Unif. Comparative Fault § 2, 12 U.L.A. 43-44 (1985 Supp.). The principles
of comparative negligence come into play when the plaintiff is also at fault; those of
comparative contribution when two or more defendants are found liable.
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The holding in Elmore should not be interpreted to mean that state-of-
the-art evidence will never be admissible in product liability actions. The deci-
sion to adopt a system of comparative fault in Gustafson was based primarily
on the Court's desire to attain "fairness and justice" for both the plaintiff and
the defendant.137 That same desire will undoubtedly lead the Court to decide
that Missouri law and sound social policy considerations require the admission
of state-of-the-art evidence in a number of circumstances.
MELODY R. DAILY
137. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 13. In explaining why it chose to reject the doc-
trine of last clear chance, the court quoted Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH.
L. REv. 465, 474 (1953):
It is still no more reasonable to charge the defendant with the plaintiffs share
of the consequences of his fault than to charge the plaintiff with the defen-
dant's; and it is no better policy to relieve the negligent plaintiff of all respon-
sibility for his injury than it is to relieve the negligent defendant.
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